by Robert MacSwain, edited by Vesa Hautala.

These posts are based on a presentation titled “Sainthood and Effective Altruism” given by Dr. MacSwain (institutional information here) in an EA for Christians guest speaker event. The presentation was based on his essay, “Are Effective Altruists Saints? Effective Altruism, Moral Sainthood, and Human Holiness”, published in Effective Altruism and Religion: Synergies, Tensions, Dialogue, edited by Roser, Riedener, and Huppenbauer (Nomos, 2022).

Part 1 of this post explored the meaning of sainthood, focusing on the moral philosophical definition by philosopher J. O. Urmson: saints are those who go far beyond the call of duty, performing supererogatory actions (acts that are good but not obligatory). Philosopher Susan Wolf argued against a saintly life because in her opinion excessive devotion to moral goods would crowd out nonmoral goods like wit, art, music, and leisure, and not lead to a well-rounded life. Peter Singer explicitly denies that effective altruists are saints because he does not think they (or almost any of them) can claim to live what he sees as a fully ethical life and because it is uncertain whether he recognizes the category of supererogation at all.

All of these opinions on sainthood are operating within Urmson’s definition, but should we accept it? I propose that we should expand the concept to include holiness as well as morality. I largely follow the philosopher Robert Merrihew Adams in his famous response to Wolf.

Adams begins by saying that there are in fact real genuine extraordinary saints among us, among whom he includes Christians (like Mother Teresa) and non-Christians (like Gandhi) and he acknowledges that such saints are often “devoted to improving the lives and circumstances of other people.” But he denies Wolf’s assumption that ethical or political concerns are their primary motivation, for in his view “sainthood is essentially a religious phenomenon.” What Adams calls the “substance of sainthood” is not “sheer willpower striving… to accomplish a boundless task,” as Wolf assumes, but “goodness overflowing from a boundless source.”

According to Adams, “Saints are people in whom the holy or divine can be seen. In a religious view they are people who submit themselves, in faith, to God, not only loving him but also letting his love possess them, so that it works through them and shines through them to other people. What other interests a saint may have will then depend on what interests God has, for sainthood is a participation in God’s interests.”

Singer denies that effective altruists are necessarily saints, whereas Adams denies that saints are necessarily effective altruists. For Adams, saints are not characterized solely or even primarily by altruistic interests and activities, supererogatory or otherwise, but are joyful, attractive, interesting, compelling, distinctive and even eccentric individuals possessed by divine love who radiate “unusual moral goodness” and compassion embodied through their very person or self, not simply in their actions. Against Wolf, Adams argues that, while sainthood is indeed “participation in God’s interests,” God’s own interests extend beyond morality or even religion.

So if we abandon an exclusively moral understanding of sainthood, what about the concept of supererogation? I want to suggest that sainthood properly understood is less tied to supererogation as it is to vocation. Saints as I understand them are not called to go above and beyond the call of moral duty, they are simply called to be themselves. To be sure, we are all called to be ourselves, but saints are those who actually solve this problem, discern and heed that divine call, and fulfill it in ways that provoke admiration, astonishment, and awe. The question thus becomes, “What are we called to do and be?”

Here there may be some tension with what I am saying and effective altruism, given Singer’s call to do the most good we can do. For example, the goals and methods of even Christian EA are often seen to be in conflict with some of the helping professions such as spending time and energy working with the mentally handicapped. As an example, according to Singer and many secular EA advocates, living and working in communities like L'Arche, where individuals with cognitive disabilities are fully integrated as equal members with those without disabilities, would be not considered a worthwhile undertaking or investment for those who seek to do the most good they can. Even if living in such a community is “good,” it is not “the most good you can do,” and therefore those who commit themselves to it are not seeking effectively to live “a fully ethical life.” So what should we make of this?

In regard to the primary question of this essay, “Are effective altruists saints?”, my answer is that it depends. It first depends on what we choose to mean by ‘saint’ and I do not wish to be bound by the moral categories of Urmsonian sainthood. But if I am correct that saints properly understood do what they are uniquely called to do, whatever that may happen to be, then the answer to this question also depends on such vocational discernment. Some effective altruists may well indeed be saints, but not necessarily because they are effective altruists. It depends on what they are individually called to be and do by God.

In regard to the secondary question of the essay, “Is EA supererogatory?”, my answer is also that it depends. Andrew Michael Flescher has argued that supererogation is a flexible phenomenon, and that the line of duty varies from person to person and even changes for the same individual over the course of their lifetime, depending on their growth in moral development as well as various contingent factors. There is not a fixed objective standard of duty that is the same for all people at all times. Thus, contrary to Urmson, Singer, and Wolf, saints may indeed exist and yet not exemplify supererogation, if what they do is not supererogatory for them, given their distinct charism and particular vocation. So it may well be the case that for some people effective altruism is supererogatory while for others it is obligatory. This is thus also a matter of individual discernment.

Making the meaning of sainthood and the demands of supererogatory altruism matters of individual discernment do not, of course, evade the challenging conceptual and practical questions canvassed in this essay. What, in fact, is the relationship between supererogation and altruism? How much good are we as unique individuals truly obliged to do, and at what point, if any, can we say that we have gone beyond the call of our own particular duty? Is the good we are called to do necessarily the same as the most good we can do? Should we in fact even attempt to live a “fully ethical life” and if so what would it look like? What would motivate us to embrace such radical altruism, effective or otherwise, in the first place? What does it mean for us to “discover our true selves” so that we may become saints as well? Finally, how might Christian EA differ from secular EA on these matters? However these questions are answered, those we call saints will assist us in doing so.