by Jordan Warner

Introduction: My Utilitarian Approach

Unusually for a Christian, I'd describe myself as a utilitarian, in the sense of wanting the greatest good for the greatest number. I interpret ”maximising utility” as consisting of working out how to do what's best for everyone, and then trying my best to do that. I acknowledge that my attempts to do this are inevitably constrained by my own selfishness and ignorance, but I find both my Christian faith and my participation in Effective Altruism to be helpful at addressing those shortcomings. While I can imagine being convinced to follow an alternative moral philosophy, you'd have to convince me that following that alternative philosophy would result in a better outcome - I'd basically just be a consequentialist with extra steps!

I am very aware of the criticisms of utilitarianism, and I think the central problem is defining what the ”good” consists of, or what ”best for everyone” really means. A coherent definition is necessary in order to be able to prioritise how we spend our limited resources, but defining it too narrowly risks missing out on important values that need to be preserved and promoted. As a Christian, I obviously think that there is immense value in the restored relationship with God that comes with being a Christian, but I don’t think we can say that’s the only thing that has value – humans also have physical and social needs, and while Jesus’ ministry and teaching culminated in addressing our spiritual needs, it also emphasised the important of feeding the hungry, healing the sick, and building up a community of believers.

Hedonic Utilitarianism and Its Shortcomings

The approach of the founders of Utilitarianism can be described as ”hedonic utilitarianism”, the belief that the only thing that matters is maximising pleasure and minimising pain. I'm sceptical of hedonic utilitarianism, primarily because I don't think that everything people value can be reduced to pleasure – people face decisions more complex than simply pondering which outcome they would enjoy more. Given the difficulty of determining what a utilitarian should promote, an alternative approach described as negative utilitarianism argues that morality should simply focus on preventing suffering. I can understand the appeal, since it’s much easier to agree on the things we want to avoid (pain, poverty, social isolation) than on the goals we think we should be aiming for. However, I think this philosophy is misguided, and potentially dangerous.

The primary problem that suffering-focused morality encounters is that suffering seems to be an inevitable part of life. You can meet all of people's basic needs and they will still suffer – while comparing life satisfaction across very different social contexts is difficult, it is clear from the rates of depression, suicide and substance misuse in the developed world that having your basic needs met does not prevent people from experiencing forms of suffering that are more difficult to address! While I agree that we have a moral duty to address the suffering of others, I think that the fundamental problem with adopting a suffering-focused morality is that it has plenty to say about the problems of life, but nothing to say about what makes life worth living in spite of this. I think this kind of philosophy leads to at least a theoretical endorsement of suicide (if we assume that people can't suffer when they'd dead, although belief in the existence of an afterlife may change that) and definitely encourages anti-natalism, since the easiest way to avoid suffering is to never be born.

There are darker directions the philosophy may lead, but I won't belabour the point - all philosophies can be used to justify mass murder if you really want to. Still, there is something troubling about a philosophy that objects to people dying primarily because the death is likely to be painful. While being motivated by compassion for others is admirable, I’m concerned about the directions a moral system that only places value on avoiding suffering may lead.

I don't intend to dismiss the pain that life can cause us, but my understanding of suffering is that it is basically random and meaningless, and is therefore a poor basis for morality. As a Christian, I accept that suffering can be part of God’s plan, but I don’t think of this in terms of God planning out a series of tragedies in advance. Most of my pain (physical and emotional) was due to my own actions, or the actions of others, or simply because I live in a world in which people get sick and eventually die. Rather than assuming that everything happens for a reason (an often-expressed sentiment that rarely provides any comfort), I believe that God meets us where we are, and helps us get through it.

The Role of Christians in Reducing Suffering

There are ways to prevent or reduce suffering, and I think that this is one of our callings as Christians – to feed the hungry, treat the sick, and comfort those who mourn. However, suffering is still going to happen, almost entirely independent of how much or how little we deserve it – while some may hope for justice in the afterlife, I personally pray for mercy. The way that I see it, a life worth living is not achieved by the minimisation of suffering or the maximisation of pleasure, but by having purpose and meaning to sustain you through suffering. A suffering focused morality cannot comprehend any of the greatest human achievements - why would someone risk humiliation, pain and death in order to climb a mountain, reach the south pole or proclaim the Gospel to a hostile people? I think that these kinds of actions are best explained by the pursuit of a purpose deemed to be more important than either pleasure or pain. While a hedonic utilitarian could argue that this is still about achieving some kind of satisfaction, the motivation for a potentially self-destructive pursuit seems very different from the more simple desire to enjoy food, health, and time with friends and family. That’s not to say pleasures aren’t important, they’re just not the only thing with value.

As a Christian, I find that meaning through my relationship with God and with other people (the two greatest commandments, Matthew 22:30-40). I haven't suffered much, but during the lowest moments of my life, it wasn't the thought of future pleasure that sustained me, it was remembering that I am loved by my family, by my friends and by God, even though at the time I was convinced that I didn't deserve that - in short, I had a purpose, and that kept me going. Focusing on my own suffering would have been very counterproductive! This may be the reason I find Niezsche and the existentialists the most compelling of the atheist philosophers - they take the problem of finding meaning very seriously!

The Practical Relevance to Effective Altruism

This has been a mostly theoretical discussion, but I do think that what we choose to value has practical relevance to Effective Altruism and the projects we invest in. While many of the charities recommended by GiveWell have value for alleviating or preventing suffering, a compelling argument for a project like GiveDirectly is that it enables people to decide for themselves how the money is spent, investing it in the things that they find most meaningful to them. While we cannot exactly quantify this, when donating our money we should keep in mind that people have things that they value other than simply avoiding pain and sickness, or we may find ourselves overlooking giving opportunities that are impactful but harder to quantify.

Additionally, valuing human civilisation as a collective project we are all contributing towards may also affect our perspective on existential risk – lacking this perspective, a suffering-focused morality would conclude that it wouldn't be all that bad if humanity went extinct, as long as it happened quickly and wasn't too painful! While I cannot definitively say what the appropriate ethical framework for all Christians should be, I do think it’s important to consider all of the implications of any philosophy, before you allow it to guide your actions.