Part 3: Is Effective Altruism open in principle to theism?

by David Leech

Naturalistic worldview and the possible futility of everything.

Summary

• it is at least possible that a naturalistic EA worldview - through strong, or weak futility - may have significant negative impact on how EAs perceive the meaningfulness of EA

• it would therefore be reasonable, and in keeping with EA principles, for EAs to take the philosophy of religion seriously as part of a wide ranging exploration of worldviews, and keep a scout mindset towards a disjunction of alternative worldviews, including theism

In the previous post I suggested that if metaphysical naturalism is true, it is plausible that strong futility may supervene on all human projects, even the most ambitious longtermist ones, and therefore on EA simpliciter. By strong futility, I understood with Seachris a scenario where ‘if the final state of affairs of [the universe] is one in which nothing matters, then nothing ever really mattered’.1 That is to say, if the final state is one in which human civilisation as well as (eventually) the physical universe itself will go out of existence, either through a Big Freeze, heat death, a Big Crunch etc., and if one has the intuition that a human project’s meaningfulness has something to do with whether it lasts, then everything may be meaningless, because ultimately, absolutely nothing will last.

Does strong futility supervene on a naturalistic EA worldview?

It seems clear that some secular EAs may think that strong futility does supervene on the standard EA worldview. For instance, in the post How to Survive the End of the Universe, avturchin canvasses different ways of overcoming the possible endings of the entire universe – presumably, to evade futility – and a posted comment at the end of the post seems tacitly to accept strong futility:

none of these solutions seem highly plausible…[i]f we take a more reductionist / psychological approach and reduce the problem to ...

(a) despair in the futility of doing anything in an impermanent universe or 

(b) fear of death and so a desire for immortality ...

... it might be worth considering despair work, distraction strategies, fear work, anti-depressants and other mind-altering strategies, so that these emotions become less problematic…The ultimate truth may turn out to be, "nothing works, and all life is doomed!" So perhaps we need ....

3. Acceptance therapy?

The sentiment expressed here does seem implicitly to assume that the ability of human projects to last has something to do with their meaningfulness. It can of course be objected that it is precisely a thing’s impermanence which makes it precious or meaningful. We don’t need to adjudicate this point here, and EAs may, I think, reasonably contest the claim that the meaningfulness of EA projects depends on their ability to last. My point here is simply that it does not seem prima facie unreasonable that the universe’s ultimate demise may put the meaningfulness of EA projects into question.

Consider Seachris’s analogy of a romantic relationship:2 if a romantic partner could somehow impossibly peer into the future and see that their relationship will dissolve rather than last, this would plausibly have a deflationary effect on their evaluation of the relationship’s meaning both in the present moment - however happy - and as a whole. Similarly, those within the EA community who are committed to a metaphysically naturalistic worldview, may regard the end of the universe - naturalistically understood - as having a deflationary effect on their evaluation of the meaningfulness of the EA projects to which they are committed, and of EA as a whole (and indeed, of anything at all).

The potential challenge of strong futility could, and perhaps should, motivate EAs towards engaging with philosophy of religion and nearby expert classes at an object-level

Given the prima facie challenge to the meaningfulness of EA projects which may - and I stress, may - be posed by metaphysical naturalism, it seems reasonable that secular EAs could invest in trying to scope out philosophically whether strong futility, weak futility, or no futility at all supervenes on the assumption of something like the standard naturalistic EA worldview (assuming, that is, that humans could not plausibly overcome the possible endings of the entire universe and immortalise themselves naturalistically), and whether there may be rational grounds for taking other worldviews - on which futility may not supervene - seriously. This could, and perhaps should, motivate secular EAs towards engaging with philosophy of religion at an object-level. This is not the same as motivating secular EAs to look at theism alone, or in particular. There are a range of worldview possibilities, including but not limited to theism – cosmopsychism, ultimism, panpsychism, idealism etc. Secular EAs could investigate these in the philosophy of religion and nearby expert classes like analytic metaphysics and philosophy of mind. Secular or agnostic EAs taking an interest in the philosophy of religion need not therefore understand their interest as looking exclusively at whether theism or atheism is true, but as looking at whether anything other than metaphysical naturalism might be true. But of course, theism would also be on the table. For at least these reasons, I suggest that it would be reasonable, and in keeping with EA principles, for EAs to take the philosophy of religion seriously and keep a scout mindset towards a range of worldview options, including theism.

1Seachris, Joshua. 2011. “Death, Futility, and the Proleptic Power of Narrative Ending.” Religious Studies 47 (2): 145-146.

2Seachris, Joshua. 2011. “Death, Futility, and the Proleptic Power of Narrative Ending.” Religious Studies 47 (2): 154-155.